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Abstract
Background: Work capacity correlates weakly to disease concepts, which in turn are insufficient
to explain sick leave behavior. With data mainly from Sweden, a welfare state with high sickness
absence rates, our aim was to develop an explanatory theory of how to understand and deal with
work absence and sick leave.
Methods: We used classic grounded theory for analyzing data from >130 interviews with people
working or on sick leave, physicians, social security officers, and literature. Several hundreds of
typed and handwritten memos were the basis for writing up the theory.
Results: In this paper we present a theory of work incentives and how to deal with work absence.
We suggest that work disability can be seen as hurt work drivers or people caught in mode traps.
Work drivers are specified as work capacities + work incentives, monetary and non-monetary.
Also, people can get trapped in certain modes of behavior through changed capacities or incentives,
or by inertia. Different modes have different drivers and these can trap the individual from
reincentivizing, ie from going back to work or go on working. Hurt drivers and mode traps are
recognized by driver assessments done on several different levels. Mode driver calculations are
done by the worker. Then follows employer, physician, and social insurance officer assessments.
Also, driver assessments are done on the macro level by legislators and other stakeholders.
Reincentivizing is done by different repair strategies for hurt work drivers such as body repair, self
repair, work-place repair, rehumanizing, controlling sick leave insurance, and strengthening
monetary work incentives. Combinations of these driver repair strategies also do release people
from mode traps.
Conclusion: Reincentivizing is about recognizing hurt work drivers and mode traps followed by
repairing and releasing the same drivers and traps. Reincentivizing aims at explaining what is going
on when work absence is dealt with and the theory may add to social psychological research on
work and work absence, and possibly inform sick leave policies.
Background
The sickness absence rate in Sweden is one of the highest
in the world [1]. Sweden has generous sick leave policies
and strong job protection legislation. There is no upper
time limit for sick leave, and a low risk of loosing employ-
ment due to sickness absence. Monetary compensation
from social security limits the loss of buying power to 0–
20% after tax for people with low to average incomes on
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sick leave [2]. A too soft and disincentivizing social secu-
rity system was a central political issue leading to a shift in
Swedish government in 2006.
In welfare states such as Sweden non-monetary work
incentives such as plight and pride seem more important
than in laissez-faire economies such as the USA [2,3],
where monetary work incentives are stronger [4].
Although Swedish sick leave compensation is generous a
sick leave trajectory often involves shame and distrust.
Against this background common disease concepts are
inadequate to explain sick leave behavior since work
capacity alone shows little correlation to disease severity
[5-7]. Therefore our aim was to generate an explanatory
theory of work absence and sick leave and how to deal
with it.
Methods
Participants
Data collection started in 2003. We did 20 formal and 42
informal interviews with people working and on sick
leave, informal interviews with 30 Swedish health care
professionals (nurses, physicians and physiotherapists),
and formal interviews and focus group interviews with 10
employees of the Swedish social insurance agency
(Försäkringskassan, FK). We did secondary analysis of
taped and transcribed formal interviews with 20 partici-
pants in a Swedish rehabilitation study [8,9] and 12
American employees of a public transportation company
[10]. We examined data from expert group meetings, con-
ferences, and literature data as well as quantitative data on
sick leave in a cohort of 196 people. Participation by the
first author in international grounded theory workshops
2003–2006 was a source of both interview data and
memos. Table 1 shows characteristics of the participants.
Data analysis
We did classic grounded theory (GT) analysis according to
Glaser [11-15] aiming at generating conceptual theories
abstract of time, place and people. Classic GT differs from
studies using qualitative data that often claim to be GT
[16] by presenting explanatory concepts rather than
descriptions. All of the data mentioned above was com-
pared in the analysis according to the classic GT "all is
data" dictum [12]. Field notes from interviews not taped
were coded and compared in the same way as transcripts
from taped interviews. All initial interviews were done
with the "staying open" attitude of GT and the researcher
being a "big ear" to the participant. We used no interview
guides and posed no structured questions in the begin-
ning of the research. In later stages of the study selective
interviewing and coding was done with the emergent the-
ory guiding our data collection. We also analysed the lit-
erature based on classic GT principles. A literature review
was thus not done until central concepts of the theory had
emerged through a cyclic process of collecting, coding,
and comparing incidents in the data. Theoretical memos,
in the shapes of text, diagrams, and figures, were written,
typed, or drawn and several hundreds of pages of typed
and handwritten memos sit in the memo bank from
which this paper was sorted and written up. "Memos are
the theorizing write-up of ideas about substantive codes
and their theoretically coded relationships as they emerge
during coding, collecting and analyzing data" [12].
Memos were eventually sorted and written up according
to classic GT. We now compared relationships between
categories and concepts using theoretical codes
[11,13,15]. The writing of two working papers enhanced
memo sorting: in 2005 for a Swedish research report [17]
and in 2006 for a GT seminar in London, UK. The inten-
sity of the analytic process increased over time. The theory
was modified until the last writings of this article as a
response to helpful peer reviewer suggestions. In sum-
mary, GT research is done in sequence, simultaneously,
subsequently, serendipitously, but at the same time
scheduled [12].
Many research methods consider persons or patients as
units of analysis, whereas in GT the unit of analysis is the
incident [18] of which the number often amounts to sev-
eral hundred in a GT study since every participant often
reports many incidents. When comparing many incidents
in an area the emerging concepts and their relationships
are in reality probability statements and thus classic GT is
not a qualitative but a general method that can use any
type of data [14]. The inductive nature of classic GT with
hypotheses being generated has its roots in quantitative
inductive research [12,19]. GTs are not reports of facts but
Table 1: Characteristics of participants.
Number of 
people
Age span (mean age) Women/Men, % Non-Swedes and 
immigrants
Education >12 
years
Sick-listed/disability 
pension
Formal interviews 52 20–65 55/45 40% 40%* 60%
Informal interviews 72 20–80* 60/40* 25%* 80%* 20%*
Group interviews 10 30–60 80/20 0% 100% 0%
Quantitative sick 
leave data
196 21–62 (47) 50/50 19% 40%* 75%
*approximationsBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:100 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/100
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integrated conceptual hypotheses based on empirical
data. Validity is hence not an issue in GT research, which
instead should be judged by fit, relevance, workability,
and modifiability [12]. Fit has to do with how close con-
cepts fit with the incidents they are representing. The the-
ory works when it explains how the problem is solved
with variation. A relevant theory fits, works, and deals
with the real concern of participants and grabs attention.
A modifiable theory can be altered when new relevant
data is compared to existing data. A GT is never right or
wrong, it just has more or less fit, relevance, workability
and modifiability, and readers of this paper are asked to
try its quality according to these principles.
The regional ethics committee at Lund University
approved this study (LU-390-03), and interviews were
made with informed consent from participants.
Results
Reincentivizing is a theory explaining difficulties and
strategies to help people go back to work after sick leave
or other reasons for work absence.
Understanding incentives, capacities, modes, drivers and 
traps
In this study drivers are specified as a combination of
incentives and capacities to pursue a certain mode of
action such as work. Traps are situations where drivers are
locked in a certain mode. The notions of traps and drivers
can explain many issues regarding disability and sick list-
ing.
"A driver is what makes you go on in a mode and a trap is what
prevents you from getting out of it" from theoretical memo
We define a driver as a combination of incentives or moti-
vators and capacities. Work capacities are education,
health, training, physical and psychological abilities, and
social skills etc. Non-monetary work incentives are fellow-
ship, identity, meaning, desire, plight, pride, and "flow"
[20] but also shame-avoidance [21] etc. Monetary work
incentives or non-work incentives are wage and sick leave
compensation, unemployment benefits, fringe benefits or
expenses such as meal costs, clothes, traveling, and time to
do repairs of homes, cars etc.
A change in incentives or capacities can hurt mode drivers.
Illness may hurt a work mode driver if the work mode
capacity goes down. Eventually a hurt work driver may
cause sick leave.
Hurt capacities and incentives eventually traps a person in
a certain mode, (see below). In addition, time dependant
inertia can trap mode drivers. This means that the longer
a person has been in a certain mode the more difficult it
is to change that mode, and thus the person gets trapped.
Thus, if a person has been on sick leave for a long time it
is difficult to go back to work since the inertia that comes
from being in the sick leave mode for a certain time pre-
vents the person from going back to work.
"after three months of sick leave it is difficult for people to
return to work" physician, male middle aged
Recognizing hurt work drivers and traps
Many driver assessments are done in sick leave situations.
This either results in reincentivizing or disincentivizing a
work return.
Mode driver calculation
Primarily, every person aims for her optimal "being
mode" by an automatic mode driver calculation (Mdc),
modified after Ekström (2005) [22]. A Mdc has three
main outcomes: preserving a mode, limiting losses within a
mode, and eventually reevaluating  a mode. The Mdc
weighs up mode incentives and capacitites in a cost-bene-
fit calculus. Let's say an ill person is uncertain about being
able to work since he/she feels depressed or suffers pain
while working. So the work driver is hurt. Then mode pre-
serving is first done: Enduring anxiety and pain by sticking
to fundamental beliefs, strategies, and explanatory mod-
els. Keeping up habits, goals and daily life and continue
working. Or the person goes on to limiting losses: Trying to
stay in the mode as long as possible. Trying to master the
situation by seeking knowledge, investing in life style
changes, new health care contacts, or cutting down work,
changing work tasks, taking short sick leaves or holidays.
Or the person eventually re-evaluates the situation: Chang-
ing the mode by going on long sick leave, or changing job.
If illness is severe enough the preserving and limiting
stages are bypassed into immediate reevaluation.
Sick leave in itself can be seen as a mode with its own driv-
ers. The Mdc basically determines whether an ill person
works or stays at home. Ill health is then only one factor
in the calculus. An ill person with an otherwise high work
capacity combined with strong work incentives (monetary
and non-monetary) has a strong work driver and a low
risk of sick leave. Another ill person with an otherwise low
work capacity and weak work incentives has a high risk of
sick leave, See Table 2.
Being modes affect incentives. While working the ill per-
son primarily wants to preserve the work mode, but may
eventually reevaluate the situation and go on sick leave.
Having been on sick leave for some time the sick leave
mode gets stronger through inertia. The Mdc now pre-
serves another status quo and thus either reincentivizes
work or chooses sick leave (see trapped mode drivers).BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:100 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/100
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Should I go on working despite my symptoms or stay at home?
Should I return to work now as my symptoms are reduced or
should I stay at home until they are completely gone? If I stay
home from work what is the cost in terms of money and/or
humiliation from my employer/fellow workers and/or the social
insurance and what are the gains in terms of reduced suffering?
from theoretical memo
Other participants in the sick leave situation also make
assessments and mode driver calculations:
Employer assessment
Employers may use a calculus similar to the Mdc when an
employee turns ill. Preserving the existing situation is first
done. This is followed by limiting losses, ie having the per-
son cut down on tasks. Finally, the employer is reevaluat-
ing the situation, often by replacing the person by another
employee, eventually permanentely. This replacement
reevaluating strategy disincentivizes work return. But, if
the employer regularly contacts absent employees and
cooperates with the FK (social insurance) this can reincen-
tivize work return. In rehabilitation planning the
employer input is crucial for a work return.
Physician assessment
Physicians also calculate hurt work drivers in a physician
assessment, which can either reincentivize or disincentiv-
ize work return. When writing sick leave notes physicians
are either reincentivizing work return by being restrictive
about sick leave:
"You don't really need sick leave for this condition, you can
actually go on working!"middle aged male physician
or disincentivizing it by doing what the patient wants
[23].
"How long sick leave do you want [me to write in the sick leave
note]" (middle aged male physician).
Social insurance (FK) officials'assessments
When assessing requests for sick leave FK either reincen-
tivizes work return by handling cases restrictively – "Tired-
ness is not a reason for sick leave" FK executive
or disincentivizes work return by speeding up "client"
turn-over and promptly providing sick leave benefits:
"The trick is to feed the PUMA (permanent and automatic ben-
efit payment without control of sick leave status, abbreviated
PUMA in Swedish)" FK official.
So whether an ill person goes on sick leave depends on the
Mdc, and assessments of employer, physicians and FK
officials. But there is also a higher societal or macro level
that determines sick leave behavior:
Macro level assessment
On the macro or society level the social insurance has
three ways to go in the sick leave situation. Either preserv-
ing the present sick leave policies regarding legislation and
compensation levels; or limiting sick leave by moderately
restricting policies or by influencing attitudes towards sick
leave; or reappraising the situation by radical changes of
policies.
Another way of explaining sick leave and work absence is
the notion of mode traps that are obstacles for reincentiv-
izing. A person can get trapped in a certain mode of
behavior through different (dis)incentivizors such as iner-
tia, changing incentives or capacities. There are different
drivers for different modes and these can trap the individ-
ual from reincentivizing work, ie from going back to work
or go on working. Below are examples of traps associated
with work and sickness absence and the reader may prob-
ably come to think of more trap types already.
Body trap
A person suffering pain or ill-health can be said to have a
body-trapped work driver. This is the traditional reason
for sick leave. The work incentives may be there, but they
are locked in the hurt body. Basically, "body trap" means
that your body prevents you from working. Work incen-
tives could be high but body capacity is low.
"It is like your body energy is trapped, you can barely handle
everyday tasks and work is unthinkable" middle-aged
woman.
"When body says no, work incentives are low" middle-aged
man
Sick role trap
This is common trap indicating that illness and sick leave
can induce identity changes in a person so that the sick-
ness mode becomes normal.
Table 2: Strength of work driver in relation to risk of sick leave
High work capacity Low work capacity
Strong work incentives Strong work driver gives low risk of sick leave Average work driver gives intermediate risk of sick leave
Weak work incentives Average work driver gives intermediate risk of sick leave Weak work driver gives high risk of sick leave
A 2×2 table presenting risk of sick leave as a function of degree of work capacity and work incentives.BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:100 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/100
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"after two to three months of sickness absence the patient often
gets stuck in a sickness role that is very difficult to get out of"
FK (social insurance) physician expert. Medicalization, ie
when non-medical problems become medical issues also
strengthens the sick role.
Poverty trap
Monetary disincentivizors in the Swedish labor market
has been recognized by the government report "Out of the
poverty trap" [24]. In Sweden it is difficult for persons on
long-term sick leave with a low income to increase their
income by returning to work due to marginal effects of the
social security system. These marginal effects are disincen-
tivizing work by reincentivizing non-work modes. Also,
the poverty trap often brings on dehumanizing side effects
of being outside of society and the work force such as
impaired health and lowered self confidence.
Fox trap
A person on sick leave having a limited work capacity
belongs neither in the work mode nor in the sick leave
mode. Instead of being on full time sick leave or working
full time despite illness a person can be on partial time
sick leave (common in Sweden). However, having no
employement the person is in the fox trap – "you are too
healthy to be on sick leave" says the FK official, while the
employment service agent says "you are too ill to be work-
ing".
Honey trap
This mode trap may cause future work absence. Too much
stimulation by strong work incentives, both monetary and
non-monetary will eventually trap a person in a high pace
work mode difficult to get out of. Eventually this causes
illness and a limited future work capacity. People working
with creative tasks thus risk getting stuck in the honey
trap. Family life and leisure are annoying breaks in work,
which becomes the primary meaning of life. The honey
trap involves a reincentivizing positive feedback mecha-
nism. The incentive makes you work more, which gives
more incentive, and finally you cannot stop working at a
pace that is too high for your capacities. Eventually the
work driver is hurt.
"At X the honey trap is a fact. People get here from all over the
world. They love their work – solving problems etc, and if they
don't watch out they get stuck in the (honey) trap..." Middle
aged employee with creative job in multinational com-
pany.
System trappers
Some people in welfare states take advantage of the com-
pensations in the welfare system. One might say that they
are "working the system", and we may call them system
"trappers" since their behavior could be compared to that
of hunters and gatherers. System trappers are found in
every society with a welfare system but seem especially
common in areas where people traditionally make their
living from hunting, fishing, and forestry, and where reg-
ular jobs are limited. In scarsely populated parts of Can-
ada it is considered socially acceptable to do paid work as
little as possible and rely on social security as an impor-
tant monetary support. Similarly, in Sweden scarsely pop-
ulated areas have the highest number of people on sick
leave and unemployement benefits. Attitudes towards
such benefits in these areas are less linked to shame than
in other areas with a stronger labor market. Also in
Bolivia, the native population collect (in comparison to
western standards) limited welfare subsidies in the same
way as they collect natural resources through hunting,
fishing and gathering. So, even if work incentives seem to
vary culturally, geographically and demographically, there
are important similarities.
Reincentivizing work by driver repair and trap release
Reincentivizing is done by repairing hurt work drivers, ie
hurt capacities and incentives for work. When drivers are
hurt they need repair, and by repairing them the traps get
released. The different repair strategies are linked to each
other in a multitude of ways and often occur simultane-
ously.
Driver repair – capacity, non-monetary and monetary 
incentive repair
Reincentivizing by improving the health and well being of
a person on sick leave is fundamental. We call a first and
almost self-evidentiary aspect of it body repair.
Body repairs
for impaired body capacities are medication, physiother-
apy, surgery, rehabilitation programs [8,9] and alternative
therapies. Succesful treatments eventually reincentivize
the work return. Irrepairable illness often leads to disabil-
ity compensation such as a disability pension.
Self repair
Socializing with friends and relatives, having pets, physi-
cal exercise, and hobbies may enhance non-monetary
incentives and restore work capacity at the same time. This
is achieved by an improved well-being which ameliorates
work return. However, long duration of self-repair activi-
ties might weaken the work driver since long time away
from work disincentivizes work return through the inertia
of being in a non-work mode.
Work-place repair
Making the work place a better environment for the
employee can reincentivize work. Bad management may
cause emotional strains that risks eroding work identity, a
powerful work incentive. It is therefore important thatBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:100 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/100
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supervisors try to create a positive emotional atmosphere
[25]. Structured back-to-work programs where absent
employees are contacted and fellow workers informed of
possible changes in task assignments when the absentee
returns are also beneficial. It seems as the more employers
are engaged in rehabilitation programs the more work can
be reincentivized [25].
Rehumanizing
Strengthening non-monetary work incentives and thus
increasing work capacity can prevent a person from going
on sick leave. This can be achieved by joining support net-
works in the workplace that may startle a rehumanizing
process [26] promoting authenticity, safety and healing.
By giving network members challenge, experimentation,
and creativity, this can provide the worker with new
energy and learning.
Controlling sick leave insurance
There are three main ways to reincentivize work by con-
trolling the sick leave insurance. First, making it more dif-
ficult to obtain by controlling its eligibility. Second,
controling non-monetary incentives, and third making it
less financially beneficial to be on sick leave.
Controlling insurance eligibility
Reincentivizing would be enhanced by a stricter control of
the sick leave insurance eligibility, which has been charac-
terized as being too "soft". A stricter control means that FK
and employer assessments have to be tougher. Hence, the
trust in the Mdc and physician assessment is often
reduced. A 2006 government report suggests the use of
Medical Disability Advisor (MDA) guidelines from the
USA for limiting the length of sick leave periods [27].
Controlling non-monetary incentives
Shame, fear and plight could disincentivize sick leave. In
national multimedia ad campaigns FK linked sick leave to
shameful behavior and subtle fraud. Hence, by inflicting
shame, and appealing to societal plight people would
become less prone to go on sick leave.
"it (the ad campaign) puts a sick leave controller in the head of
the person on sick leave" regional FK CEO.
In a postal intervention study to newly sick-listed persons
sick leave periods of >12 weeks were reduced for the group
receiving brief information and a short questionnaire
[28].
Controlling monetary compensation
Hurt monetary incentives disincentivizes a return to work
for those who have been on sick leave long enough to
trust the monthly payments from the FK. By cutting down
monetary compensation levels of sick leave (and of unem-
ployment benefits) it is possible to reincentivize work
[3,29].
"Sick leave would probably go down if compensation levels were
lowered..." former national FK CEO
Strengthening monetary work incentives
Making work monetarily advantageous in relation to non-
work could be done on the macro level by using tax poli-
cies. In the UK working families get a special tax deduc-
tion as compared to families on welfare. In Sweden the
new 2006 government launched a tax deduction eligible
only for workers, not for people on sick leave or retire-
ment pension.
Trap release
Traps are essentially released by the above repair strate-
gies. Either body and/or work place repair can release
from a body trap. Improving impaired health situations
and work place conditions can help workers with health
problems to return to work. Controlling sick leave insur-
ance and strengthening monetary work incentives might get
people out of the poverty trap. By all three strategies a sick
role trap or a fox trap can be released. Education or job
training programs could release from the fox trap by
increasing work capacity. A Honey trap can be prevented by
self repair or work place repair. Some employers are aware
of honey-traps and prevent their employees from getting
consumed by overmotivating jobs. They sense signals of
overstimulation and require that employees take time off.
So a release from the honey-trap can be done through an
initiative from the employer or another person in order to
prevent a future damage to the work driver. System trappers
can be controled by sick leave insurance repair. A stricter
control of eligibility and reduced monetary compensation
of different types of social insurance will prevent people
from abusing the welfare system.
Discussion
In this study of work absence and sick leave we present a
theory explaining why it may be difficult to return to work
after sick leave, and what can be done to ease the return.
Reincentivizing indicates that work incentives, both mon-
etary and non-monetary, and not only health related fac-
tors are important in the process of a work return [30].
Reincentivizing is a theoretical model that fits with the
wide range of data from which it was generated. It also
works to explain many work and sick leave related issues.
The model applies to the Swedish situation with one of
the highest sickness absence rates in the world, but we
believe that reincentivizing is relevant for other settings as
well. To understand reincentivizing we start with specify-
ing concepts that are central to the theory. Then follows
recognizing hurt work drivers and traps. Third, reincentiv-BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:100 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/100
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izing is done by repairing hurt capacities and incentives,
and releasing from traps.
We did classic grounded theory (GT) analysis according to
Glaser [11-15] to develop the reincentivizing theoretical
model. We interviewed people working or on sick leave as
well as physicians and social insurance officials, and also
analyzed literature. Our procedure was similar to previous
studies in other substantive areas [31,32]. GT is the most
cited single method for analyzing qualitative data accord-
ing to Google Scholar where the first GT methodology
[18] had 6995 citations in May 2007. Yet classic GT stud-
ies are rare. They represented <10% of 200 consecutive
studies referring to the method in a PubMed search in
2005–2006 done by the first author. Most studies were
descriptive and lacked a core variable theory, which is
required in classic GT.
The concept driver is fundamental to reincentivizing and
commonly used in contemporary Swedish language:
"what is your driver?" "what is the driver in your life...". In
GT this is called an in-vivo code, ie it comes from the par-
ticipants in the interview data. Trap is another in-vivo
code from the area of sick leave used by unions, employer
organizations, and government agencies. The body trap is
another way of expressing work absence due to illness –
the worker is trapped in a harmed body. To be in a honey
trap resembles the colloquial expression "workaholic".
Poverty trap is a concept borrowed from a Swedish gov-
ernment report [24] and sociology. A similar concept is
called "low pay traps" that are disincentives for people to
stay in the workforce [33]. Fox trap is a concept found in
a white-collar workers union report. The mode driver cal-
culation (Mdc) is a concept generated by inspiration from
two grounded theories – "Cutting back after a heart
attack" [34], "Keeping my ways of being" [22] and Jeremy
Bentham's "hedonic calculus" [35]. Mullen suggested that
people having suffered a heart attack "cut back" in their
lives after a complex calculus. Ekström proposed that
women in midlife apply a personal calculus to keep up
their way of being when faced with insecurity caused by
midlife changes. Jeremy Bentham in 1798 claimed that
every person was aiming for ultimate happiness by apply-
ing a "hedonic calculus" in life: "promoting whatever fac-
tors led to the increase of pleasure and suppressing those
which produced pain".
Our theory of reincentivizing work fits in the literature on
work, sickness absence and unemployment in several
diverse fields such as sociology, economics and medicine
[1-4,7-9,21,29,30,35,36]. It attempts to integrate previous
research findings together with new empirical data in an
explanation of what motivates complex fundamental
human behavior such as work. Theoretical explanatory
models for sick leave behavior are scarce. A process model
explaining absenteeism with data from the USA has been
presented [37]. It includes different variables such as
work-related attitudes, personal factors, market factors
and cultural and organizational norms in an organizing
framework for understanding absence research. Our the-
ory of reincentivizing seems to fit into that framework, yet
with a more parsimonious explanation. Historically work
incentives seem to be about balancing between working
for a greater good such as society or God, and working for
profit (apart from working for supporting basic life proc-
esses). In our study the non-monetary and monetary
incentives for working represent this balance. In typical
welfare states such as Sweden plight incentives are
stronger than in laissez-faire economies such as USA [2].
This is reflected in high Swedish compensation levels and
a weak control system for sick leave. The Swedish expres-
sion "writing your own sick leave note" typically indicates
the ease by which sick leave may be attained in this coun-
try. Societal stability motives for having generous sick
leave policies – possible reduced costs of health care, basic
social welfare, policing, and drug control – could legiti-
mize the present high compensation levels. But between
1997 and 2003 both unemployment and sickness absence
increased in Sweden to levels allegedly threatening the
working morale of the population and eventually the
foundation of the welfare state [3]. Hence, a crucial issue
in the 2006 parliament election campaign was to reduce
the high number of people outside of the work force. This
led to the first shift in government for 12 years with the
new government suggesting lowered compensation for
sick leave and unemployment. This was a political risk
taking since 14% of the Swedish population depends on
sick leave insurance or disability pension for their daily
living [3]. A November 2006 government report suggested
stricter sick leave assessments using the length of mean
sickness absence periods in the USA as a standard [27].
It may be argued that the value of our study is limited
since it is not traditionally deductive. Neither is it a full
description of sick leave or work absence phenomena. It is
rather inductive since GT is primarily an inductive
method. Reincentivizing work is according to GT a theory
with a certain degree of probability and ability to provide
an explanatory account of the area under study. It is not a
presentation of proven facts but a suggested conceptual
explanation of what is going on in the area of work and
sick leave. We admit that we have missed data in our com-
parative analysis of sick leave and work. We did for
instance not study self-employed people. Yet there is
Swedish data showing lower odds of sick leave in self-
employed despite more subjective illness as compared to
matched controls [38]. However, we trust that our theory
is modifiable when "missing" data is entered into the
analysis. Thus, by adding new data more concepts will
eventually be generated that will add to the theory, notBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:100 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/100
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contradict it. We therefore encourage readers to pursue
research in this field, and refine and improve the sug-
gested theory of reincentivizing work.
Conclusion
We have developed a theory suggesting that complex driv-
ers determine people's behavior. These drivers can work
either to incentivize or to reincentivize different modes.
To deal with sick leave according to the theory of reincen-
tivizing work first requires an understanding of the con-
cepts of drivers and traps. Then hurt drivers and traps are
recognized and eventually repaired and released. The the-
ory of reincentivizing work could give ideas for future
research, and possibly inform changes in sick leave poli-
cies.
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